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Abstract—Spectrum, which supports the transmission of sound, 
data, and video, is critical to the implementation of mobile 
connected society. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has been seeking policies that offer more spectrum access 
opportunities, such as secondary spectrum market and TV white 
space. In this paper, we develop the idea of trading spectrum in 
Interference Right. It means to alleviate the spectrum scarcity by 
cooperative spectrum usage and making the spectrum market as 
liquid as possible. We use some plausible case studies to illustrate 
the characteristics and features. The paper therefore includes a 
detailed description of trading procedures along with some first 
order quantitative modeling of the cases coupled with qualitative 
analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Spectrum rights have been viewed as a solution for 
spectrum allocation since Coase pointed out that the most 
efficient way to assign spectrum is to define a property- like 
right and give it to users who value it the most. Since then, 
several researchers tried to define spectrum rights via exclusive 
usage rights, which use various dimensions to define spectrum 
exclusivity. This includes DeVany’s three dimensional model 
[1] and Matheson’s seven dimensional model [2] of 
electrospace. The exclusive usage rights are implemented 
through transmission power caps and guard bands, which are 
determined by regulators. Without these two aspects, it is 
difficult to prevent spatial, out-of-band and in-band 
interference.  
In contrast to exclusive usage rights, defining rights based 
on interference restriction regulates how much interference 
could be tolerated in a certain region. This value is impacted by 
the terrain, current spectrum usage, noise level, and the 
receiver’s performance. Interference restriction is not the 
opposite of transmitter power limits. In essence, interference 
restriction evolved from transmitter power limits and demands 
the application of advanced technology and flexible 
management, since a simple transmitter power cap does not 
easily support the current high demand for spectrum and its 
dynamic usage [3]. It also pays more attention on receiver, 
since it does not make sense to slow down the spectrum 
utilization for the sake of ancient receivers. The idea of  
“tolerable interference level” shares some similarities with the 
ideas we discuss in this paper. [4] 
No matter how we define spectrum rights, the value that a 
primary user obtains from their license depends on (1) their 
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ability to earn revenues from that investment and (2) capital 
gains associated with its increasing value. The former depends 
on the ability of the license holder to deliver a suite of services 
to end users at a contracted quality level. The latter depends on 
the license holder’s ability to defend the parameters of the 
license. Interference Rights are defined by explicit 
management of interference.  In essence, they authorize 
primary users to manage both aspects of their license. They can 
earn revenues from bandwidth that has not been fully utilized 
(due to old receivers, perhaps) while maintaining the license 
parameters granted under the license. 
In this paper, we are explicitly considering cooperative 
secondary sharing according to the typology proposed by 
Weiss and Lehr [5].  In this approach, sharing a single 
spectrum hole among multiple secondary users is part of the 
outcome to be negotiated.  One likely outcome of this 
negotiation, and the one that is the focus of this paper, is that 
the interference right will be granted to a single secondary user, 
so that sharing among secondary users will not be considered 
here. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
concept of Interference Rights and how to formulate 
Interference Rights. Section III illustrates spectrum trading in 
an Interference Rights regime, including trading procedures, 
participants, operation and enforcement. Section IV provides a 
case study to illustrate this approach. Section V concludes the 
paper and outlines future research. 
II. INTERFERENCE RIGHTS 
A. The Concept of Interference Rights 
Under the Interference Rights regime, “license holders can 
write interference rights on their licenses, which can be traded, 
combined, or exchanged with other users.” [6] Interference 
Rights explicitly allow secondary users to interfere with the 
existing services offered by a primary user to a certain level. It 
degrades the resource (spectrum), but does not necessarily 
decrease the Quality of Services (QoS), since it is possible, 
within limits, to design receivers (albeit at higher cost) that are 
less sensitive to prevailing interference and noise.  Further, 
Interference Rights allow different secondary users to overlay 
with each other. In contrast, the traditional exclusive usage 
rights regime requires an “all or nothing” kind of sharing, so 
primary users can only share spectrum when they do not 
operate on it.  
We will show that there are several advantages of 
Interference Rights. First, license holders have the authority to 
control the spectrum on their own instead of having to follow 
regulators’ instructions on how to share the spectrum with 
other users. In other words, they will trade the spectrum if the 
gain is higher than not trading. Therefore, licensees have more 
motivations to trade spectrum. Second, buyers of Interference 
Rights have flexibility in deploying services. There is no 
limitation on technology, service types, transmitter location, 
and so on, as long as they remain within the parameters of the 
right. Third, Interference Rights has less regulatory 
involvement, and then reduces the transaction cost for trading 
parties. Fourth, Interference Rights may also lead to 
infrastructure development. If primary users are satisfied with 
the revenue collected from selling spectrum, they tends to 
upgrade their receivers and other equipments in order to free up 
more spectrum. Last but not least, it may also lead to a 
heterogeneous network architecture that combines microcell 
with picocell and femtocell, in order to maximum the spectrum 
utilization and social welfare. The spectrum efficiency is not 
the throughput alone, since there may be retransmission. The 
spectrum efficiency should be the ability that receivers could 
successfully interpret desired information.  
B. The Formulation of Interference Rights 
We propose that Interference Rights have five basic 
dimensions: Power density for both primary and secondary 
users, frequency band, area, and duration1. It can be written as  
ܥ௡ ≜ 	 ሼܵ௡, 	 ௡ܲ, 	ܨ௡, ܣ௡, ௡ܶ	ሽ 
 
1) Secondary Users’ Power Density ( ܵ௡ ): defines the 
maximum interference (and noise) power that can be tolerated 
by the primary user in electrospace. Clearly, this value 
changes with primary receivers’ capabilities. In other words, 
when the primary users’ receivers are less sensitive to 
interference and noise, this value would be higher (i.e., a 
primary user could sell more interference rights). The 
electrospace that can be used by secondary user also varies 
with the surrounding propagation and electromagnetic 
environment, both natural and manmade.  
2) Primary User’s Power Density ሺ ௡ܲሻ : It is also 
important for primary users to state the power density level 
that they will impose on the same electrospace as defined for 
secondary users’ power density. This is required so that the 
secondary users know what they can expect for their 
communication system. Traditionally, regulators only demand 
that secondary users not create “harmful interference” for 
primary users. In fact, secondary users also have a Signal to 
Interference and Noise Ratio (ܵܫܴܰሻ requirement and it is a 
key point for them to decide whether to buy the interference 
right or not. This value considers the secondary users’ needs 
and reduces the transaction cost for a trade.  
3) Frequency Band ሺܨ௡ሻ: defines the frequency range on 
which the spectrum users can operate. Spectrum providers 
could free up some frequency bands for trading or allow 
spectrum users to transmit in the same band. Transmission in 
the same band may lead to more interference, but spectrum 
users could control the interference level by lowering their 
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transmission power. Transmitting in different frequency band 
avoids the interference to some extent, however the actual 
performance level depends on both the transmitter filter and 
receivers’ sensitivity.  
4) Test area ሺܣ௡ሻ: determines the geographical area that 
secondary users could operate in. This could be regions in 
which primary users have few receivers.  
5) Duration ሺ ௡ܶሻ : is the period of time in which the 
secondary users may operate. The duration for Interference 
Rights can ranges from seconds to hours. Therefore, we may 
need a fluid method for trading. 
Primary users may also set other requirements in the 
contract to control their resource and QoS more tightly. For 
example, three possible extensions that could help primary 
users to define Interference Rights are Probability, Technology, 
and Penalties. 
6) Probability: Primary users can set prices based on the 
ex ante estimated probability that a secondary user affects 
their existing services, since probabilistic rights parameters 
reflect the changing radio propagation environment [7].  For 
example, a secondary user that is estimated to affect 10% of 
existing transmission would pay less than users that would 
impact 20%. This probability could be determined by 
geographic boundary, period of time, and power density. 
Setting probability-based prices would be economically 
efficient but it relies on the correct estimate of ex ante 
interference  
7) Technology: is another aspect that impacts the 
interference. Spectrum users with higher QoS requirements 
may consider specifying the type of technology as well as the 
channel type used by the secondary user. For example, it is 
known that upload channel has different characteristics than 
download channel; likewise, CDMA has different spectrum 
usage than OFDM. 
8) Penalties: for violating the terms of Interference Rights 
may be determined in the negotiated contract. This is like an 
insurance policy on the investment that both primary and 
secondary users make and helps reduce transaction costs. As 
in financial markets, trustworthy spectrum users should 
benefit from better terms and lower prices in future trading.  
Other penalties may include “black-listing” certain primary or 
secondary users [6]. 
III. SPECTRUM TRADING 
Summarizing Section II, Interference Rights allow a 
secondary user to emit a maximum amount of RF energy into 
the primary user’s electrospace.  The terms and parameters of 
this are set explicitly and are accepted by both the primary and 
secondary users.  In this section, we outline how Interference 
Rights could work in practice. 
A. Trading Procedures 
1) Define Interference Rights: The first step is that the 
primary user needs to set the parameters for Interference 
Rights. They do so with full knowledge of their transmission 
parameters, receivers’ sensitivity and distribution, QoS 
requirements, and with an awareness of how this affects their 
future service levels. If primary users do not have a high QoS 
expectation or the service level does not largely impact their 
revenue, they may choose to set a higher interference 
threshold, which may attract more buyers and result in a 
higher price.  
2) Place Interference Rights into the Market: After the 
primary users define the parameters forInterference Rights, 
they may advertise and/or offer it in a spectrum market. Thus, 
Interference Rights share similar features with options in 
financial markets (see Table I).  In financial options, asset 
owners can create (or “write”) options and sell them in an 
options exchange. In this paper, we pursue the analogy of 
Interference Rights with financial options and assume a 
market that treats them in a similar manner.  That is, we 
assume the existence of a liquid market.Spectrum providers 
who have unused spectrum could write Interference Rights 
that work more or less like a “covered call option2”, and 
(secondary) spectrum users who are ready to operate buy it.  
In purchasing Interference Rights, secondary users have the 
right (but not the obligation) to put a maximum amount of RF 
power into a defined electrospace over a certain interval.  
Because it is a call option, the buyer of the option has the right 
to purchase the underlying asset at a set price (the strike 
price).  The strike price is thus analogous to the RF power in 
the predefined electrospace in the Interference Rights. 
TABLE I.  ANALOGY OF FIANANCIAL OPTION AND INTERFERENCE 
RIGHT 
Financial Option Trading in Interference Right
Strike Price Power density permitted in 
time/space/frequency 
Expiration Expiration 
Premium Price 
3) Buying Interference Rights: The spectrum license that 
issued by FCC does not transfer or change when Interference 
Rights are initiated and bought. The buyer of Interference 
Rights only has the opportunity to operate in the electrospace 
as specified by the option (contract). Ideally, spectrum users 
should not need the regulators’ permission before trading 
Interference Rights. In reality, they may need to register with 
regulator before entering the spectrum market. Therefore, the 
regulatory involvement is minimal in trading with Interference 
Right so the transaction cost is reduced. 
B. Participants in the Trading and their behaviors 
1) Selling party: The dominant spectrum selling party 
consists of license holders who underutilize the spectrum 
whose licenses they hold. However, the selling party is not 
restricted to license holders. Sellers could also be secondary 
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users who cannot use entire Interference Rights that they 
purchased from primary users. Under this circumstance, 
secondary users may subdivide their own transmission from 
the original Interference Rights, and sell the remainders to 
others. This division could be made in terms of time, power 
density, and coverage. It futher maximizes the spectrum 
access opportunities and liquid the market, since every user 
who has spare spectrum can sell it for monetary conpensation.  
Note that this adds complexity to enforcement in the event of 
breach of contract or illicit activity.  For that reason, it is 
reasonable to expect that regulators would have an interest in 
monitoring these markets. 
2) Buying party: Users that want to operate on certain 
electrospace to provide all kinds of services but do not have 
spectrum are the dominant buying party for spectrum trading. 
Note that license holders could also buy Interference Righs to 
increase their service levels, experiment with new 
applications, and expand coverage.  
C. Operations 
After a spectrum trade takes place, both parties operate on 
the spectrum according to the contract. The contract only 
determines the affected electrospace and the duration as well as 
the price. In the most general case, the contract does not 
include transmission parameters such as the air interface, 
transmitter density, location, and power caps. Thus, secondary 
users are free to choose parameters on their own. They could 
transmit using a single station with higher power, or set a 
number of transmitters with lower power to get a larger 
geographic coverage. It is also possible for them to buy 
Interference Rights from different license holders and 
aggregate them to create a unique service area. Sensing is not 
required for operation, although it may be helpful to optimize 
spectrum utilization under the contract.  
D. Enforcement 
Enforcement remains a challenge for Dynamic Spectrum 
Access (DSA) systems of all kinds. Without enforcement, 
spectrum users cannot guarantee the value of the resource. 
Lack of effective enforcement means that users have limited 
recourse in the event of contract breaches or illicit activity, 
effectively raising the transaction costs.  It is quite likely that 
this is one of the key reasons why DSA and spectrum trading 
are not commonplace today. Enforcement benefits every party 
in the wireless communication industry. Traders have more 
guarantees on contracts when the enforcement is implemented. 
Regulators can ensure no one violates the policy by monitor the 
spectrum usage. Licensees could also assure their license terms 
with enforcement system. It is an important issue for spectrum 
trading, one that justifies a paper on its own, so we will not 
address it further here. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
The fundamental difference between exclusive usage rights 
and Interference Rights is that the former are more 
deterministic while the latter are more stochastic. Primary users 
do not surrender the entire electrospace to secondary users 
under Interference Rights. Instead, they retain a portion of the 
electrospace for their own purposes, albeit with a reduced QoS. 
In this way, customers for primary users still get some (if not 
all) of the services even though primary users released 
electrospace to others. We use TV white space as an example 
to illustrate our spectrum trading model. 
TV white spaces occur because of the spatial and frequency 
separation between stations.  This separation was used so that 
users at the fringes of each station’s service area can get 
unambiguous signal reception; that is, it is possible for those 
users to receive the signal from exactly one station in any 
particular channel.  The push to utilize this “fallow” spectrum 
has coincided with the transition from analog to digital TV and 
with increasing substitutes for video consumption, such as 
satellite, cable and Internet TV. Therefore, the profit model for 
TV broadcaster has changed, relying less on over-the-air 
transmission than in earlier eras. However, TV broadcasters 
still have a precious resource, spectrum, from which they could 
gain economic profits.   
In an attempt to strike a balance between efficient spectrum 
use and consideration of broadcasters’ business models, the 
FCC has created some rules for unlicensed operations in TV 
white spaces3.  At a high level, these rules allow transmissions 
in these white spaces on a non-interfering basis.  In this case 
study, we consider an expanded scenario, where broadcasters 
could choose to accept some interference in exchange for 
payment; i.e., they could write Interference Rights.  
Specifically, we will examine the revenues and costs for both 
primary and secondary users. Since residential customers of 
TV broadcasters are grouped into clusters, we assume that 
there are areas that do not consume over-the-air TV, instead 
consuming programming over one of the alternative media. For 
the purposes of this paper, we imagine Interference Rights 
being sold for a sector of the entire coverage area, or a ring on 
the edge of that area; other spatial models may exist as well.  
A. Operation Flexibility 
We begin by analyzing ܵܫܴܰ , since it determines 
transmission parameters and is closely related to cost and 
revenue. The ܵܫܴܰ depends on three factors. The first one is 
the distance (distance between primary users’ transmitter (Tx) 
and receiver (R) and distance between primary users’ receiver 
and secondary users’ transmitter (Ts)). The second one is 
primary and secondary users’ transmission power. The third 
one is transmitter density. We simplify the example by only 
using only one secondary transmitter. Figures 1-3 illustrate this 
idea using a free space propagation model. We use three levels 
of transmission power for both users, and plot the SINR as a 
function of the distance between Ts and Tp.  
In the scenario depicted in Figure 1, the primary user does 
not have many customers in certain section of their serrvice 
area, but they have significant user populations at the border of 
their service area. The scenario for Figure 3 is that the primary 
users’ service population decreases as a function of distance. 
Figure 2 is an intermediate example.  
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From these three examples, we will show that Interference 
Rights are more flexible in spectrum sharing than exclusive 
rights from the following perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ts at center (50km away from Tp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Ts is 79km away from Tp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Ts at edge (100km away from Tp) 
1) Primary users can adjust the spectrum sharing pattern 
with their customer distribution characteristics. For example, 
primary users who do not have many users in the area between 
40-60km from the transmitter are modelled by the first case; 
and those whodo not have many users in area between 60-
 
80km from the transmitter fit the second case; finally, primary 
users with few users in a ring around the edge of their service 
area are modelled by the third case.  
2) Using power density allows secondary users to set up 
their transmission parameters to comply with primary users’ 
requirements. It is clear from figures that same ܵܫܴܰ can be 
achieved by different transmission power and locations. This 
flexibility will be increased when the  transmitter density is 
higher. 
B. Reservation Price 
For broadcasters in the US (the primary users), revenues 
come from advertisements sold during programming.  The 
magnitude of these revenues is determined by the number of 
viewers and their demographics.  Direct costs, for broadcasters, 
are from the development and production of programming as 
well as for broadcasting operations.  For the sector model 
(model (a) above), selling Interference Rights to a sector where 
few over-the-air customers exist could allow the broadcaster to 
earn a new revenue stream and reduce costs if it is feasible to 
cease broadcasting into that region.  Broadcasters would have 
to weigh this revenue streams with lost revenues due to 
customers whose service quality diminishes. Therefore, the 
revenue and cost for DTV broadcasters (primary users) when 
the secondary user is not present can be expressed as 
                               R୔ ൌ N୴ ൈ a                                     (1) 
                               	ܥ் ൌ ܥ௣ ൅ ܥ௕ ൅ ܥி                           (2) 
where, ܴ௉  is the total revenue for primary user, ௩ܰ  is the 
number of viewers, ܽ indicates the income per viewer. ܥ்	is the 
total cost for primary user, ܥ௣  is the cost of programming 
which is a sunk cost, ܥ௕ is the cost of broadcasting and ܥி are 
fixed costs, such as overhead. The revenue and Cost for 
primary users when secondary users are absent are the same for 
exclusive usage right and interference right.  
When secondary users come into play, the revenues and 
costs for primary users under Interference Rights change as 
follows: 
                                     ܴ௉ௌ ൌ ௩ܰᇱ ൈ ܽ ൅ ܫ௦                               (3) 
                                     ܥ௉ௌ ൌ ܥ௉ ൅ ܥ௕ᇱ ൅ ܥி                            (4) 
where,  ܴ௉ௌ  is primary user’s total revenue when secondary 
users present, ௩ܰᇱ is the new number of viewers ( ௩ܰ ൒ ௩ܰᇱ due 
to intereference from secondary use), ܫ௦  is the income for 
spectrum trading. ܥ௉ௌ  is primary users’ total cost when share 
spectrum with secondary users, ܥ௕ᇱ  is the cost of broadcasting 
(ܥ௕ ൒ ܥ௕ᇱ ). 
In the case of exclusive usage rights, primary users must 
vacate the channel to enable secondary users to operate. 
Therefore, cost and revenue for primary users under exclusive 
rights are: 
                                   ܴ௉ா ൌ ܫௌா                                           (5) 
                        ܥ௉ா ൌ ܥ௉ ൅ ܥ௕ᇱ ൅ ܥி                                   (6) 
As we stated before, the incentive for primary user to trade 
spectrum with secondary users is that they are better off from 
doing so, i.e., Whether this outcome obtains depends on N୴ and N୴ᇱ , which, in turn, depends on the signal strength and SINR at 
the receiver. For the purposes of this paper, we use simple, 
high level calculations to arrive at a first order estimate of the 
subscriber loss.  
                           ܴ௉ௌ െ ܥ௉ௌ ൒ ܴ௉ െ ܥ௉                              (7) 
                           ܴ௉ா െ ܥ௉ா ൒ ܴ௉ െ ܥ௉                              (8) 
We calculate the channel capacity using the Shannon 
Hartley theorem C ൌ B ൈ logଶሺ1 ൅ SINRሻ, where, C is channel 
capacity, B is the channel bandwidth (which is 6	MHz in this 
case). Cୠ (and also Cୠᇱ ) is determined by transmission power, 
duration and electricity cost.  
                                    Cୠ ൌ b ൈ T୔ ൈ T୬                              (10) 
where, b indicates the cost of transmission in ܹ݄݇, ௉ܶ is the 
transmission power in ܹ݇, ௡ܶ is the contract during in ݄.  
For digital television, the threshold of visibility occurs at 
ܴܵܰ ൌ 15	݀ܤ	ሾ8ሿ. Below 15 dB, the picture is frozen. The 
picture is satisfactory but does not reach the entire coverage 
area when 15	݀ܤ ൏ ܴܵܰ ൑ 27	݀ܤ . The ATSC suggests 
ܴܵܰ ൌ 27	݀ܤ  as the minimum to provide adequate viewing 
over a broadcaster’s coverage area. For the purpose of our 
calculation, we assume the number of viewers ௩ܰ (and also ௩ܰᇱ) 
distribute as 
                 ௩ܰ ൌ ൝
0,																											ܵܫܴܰ ൑ 15	݀ܤ
0.3ܥ,			15	݀ܤ ൏ ܵܫܴܰ ൑ 27	݀ܤ
0.5ܥ,																					ܵܫܴܰ ൒ 27	݀ܤ
              (11) 
From this, we can determine the minimum price a primary user 
would accept (i.e., their reservation price) from a secondary 
user.  A primary user would have to earn at least as much from 
the transaction with the secondary user as they would have 
earned without secondary use, or:  
           ܫ௦ ൒ ሺ ௩ܰ െ ௩ܰᇱሻ ൈ ܽ െ ܾ ൈ ௡ܶ ൈ ሺ ௉ܶ െ ௉ܶᇱሻ         (12) 
           ܫௌா ൒ ௩ܰ ൈ ܽ െ ܾ ൈ ௡ܶ ൈ ሺ ௉ܶ െ ௉ܶᇱᇱሻ                    (13) ܫ௦ is the reservation price for a primary user under Interference 
Rights regime, and ܫ௦ா is the reservation price for a secondary 
user under exclusive rights regime. If we assume the 
reservation price is equal to the cost in each case, ܫ௦ ൑ ܫ௦ா, since 
௩ܰᇱ ൒ 0	&&	 ௡ܶ ൒ 0	&&	ሺ ௉ܶ െ ௉ܶᇱሻ ൒ 0	&&	ሺ ௉ܶ െ ௉ܶᇱᇱሻ ൒ 0 . 
Therefore, the reservation price for interference right is always 
less or equal to that for exclusive usage right. In essence, under 
exclusive usage rights, if the primary users’ original ൑ 15  , 
ܴௌா ൌ 0  since the primary user does not earn advertising 
revenue anyway. However, as long as the original ܵܫܴܰ ൐ 15, 
the reservation price must cover all potential advertisement 
cost less the savings from not broadcasting, since the primary 
user will clear up the entire channel for secondary users. 
This has some practical implications in general.  If the price 
paid by a secondary user were equal in the interference right 
and exclusive right regime, then the primary user would profit 
more from interference rights.  Alternately, the lower 
reservation price means that the primary user would be 
potentially willing to take a lower price from a secondary user, 
which could serve to stimulate demand for secondary use.  
Looking a bit deeper, we can consider three main cases 
depending on the primary users’ original ܵܫܴܰ as described in 
Table 2. If ܵܫܴܰ ൑ 15, there is no advertising income for the  
primary user, therefore the reservation price is zero. When the 
primary users’ original ܵܫܴܰ  is in the range ሺ15,27ሿ , the 
reservation price for spectrum trading must the lost advertising 
(partial or total) revenue. Finally, when the original ܵܫܴܰ ൐
27, the reservation price is equal to the partial advertising loss 
when the new ܵܫܴܰ ൑ 27. However, if the new ܵܫܴܰ ൒ 27 is, 
the reservation price is zero, since the primary users do not lose 
any customers.  
TABLE II.  PRIMARY USERS’ RESERVATION PRICE FOR DIFFERENT SINR 
REGION (INTERFERENCE RIGHTS)  
 ܵܫܴܰை ൑ 15 15 ൏ ܵܫܴܰை ൑ 27 ܵܫܴܰை ൐ 27 
ܵܫܴܰே ൑ 15 None Advertising Loss Advertising Loss
15 ൏ ܵܫܴܰே ൑ 27 N/A Advertising Loss Advertising Loss
ܵܫܴܰே ൐ 27 N/A N/A None
Figure 4 shows the broadcaster’s (primary user’s) 
reservation price by SINR  using the above parameters. In 
producing these figures, we assume that the viewers are 
uniformly distributed throughout the service area and 
secondary user’s transmitter is located 70km away from the 
primary user’s transmitter. The reservation price requirements 
vary with the SINR  “region”. Red lines represent a primary 
user’s transmission of 1000kw and it does not change when 
secondary user start transmission; the secondary user’s 
transmission power is 36kw. The original SINR is different for 
each red line. It is clear that reservation price is higher when 
the original SINR is large. The blue lines illustrate the case 
when the primary user’s transmission power is reduced by 
100kw, so that the primary user saves some money on 
broadcasting (largely depends on electricity consumption), 
which further decreases the reservation price. Finally, the green 
lines, illustrate the situation when the primary users’ 
transmission power is 1000kw and the secondary user’s 
transmission power is reduced to 16kw. It largely increases 
primary user’s SINR. The reservation price for SINR ൐ 27 is 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Reservation Price 
The secondary users’ profit comes from providing wireless 
services to its customers, which, we assume is also a function 
of channel capacity. Their cost includes the cost for spectrum 
and their operations cost. Therefore, the spectrum value (i.e., 
their maximum willingness-to-pay) for secondary user can be 
estimated by 
                               ௌܸ ൌ ݁ ൈ ܥ ൈ ݎ െ ܥ௕                         (14) 
where,  ௌܸ  is the spectrum value for secondary user, ݎ is the 
revenue that secondary users can get per customers,	݁ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሻ 
indicates the penetration of secondary users’ services. ݁  is 
positively correlated with secondary users’ ܵܫܴܰ. 
When the secondary users’ spectrum value is larger than 
primary users’ reservation price (i.e., ௌܸ ൒ ܫௌ), spectrum trades 
could occur. When this inequality does not hold, voluntary 
spectrum trades are unlikely.  The difference between these 
two metrics reflects the bargaining dynamics for the resource 
and is outside the scope of this paper.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented the concept of Interference 
Right as instruments analogous to covered financial options 
that may (but need not) be written by license holders. This is 
different from the notion of Spectrum Usage Rights (SURs) [9] 
in that these are completely determined privately, without the 
intervention of the regulator.  We illustrate this idea by two 
case studies. The first one focuses on spectrum trading 
procedures and features and the second one shows the 
economic efficiency that can be gained by this method. As seen 
from our first-order analysis, the trading in Interference Right 
offers some advantages to exclusive usage right from three 
perspectives. First, it allows users to overlay with each other 
that increase the spectrum access opportunities. Second, traders 
negotiate the Interference Right on their own, which reduce the 
transaction cost and gives more incentives for both parties. 
Third, the financial option like trading method liquid the 
market and reflect the resource value more realistically. This 
proof-of-concept evaluation indicates that additional research is 
warranted to further develop the concept and analyze its 
implications. More sophisticated modeling, such as that found 
in [10], should be performed to understand this kind of 
bargaining more fully. 
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